The activities of political parties, and particularly local party organizations, are geared toward cultivating the relationship between the electorate and those who govern. This paper adds to the theo retical and empirical literature on party activities by focusing on one of the primary mechanisms by which parties attempt to stimulate political participation on behalf of their candidates: the party canvass. Using the 1952-90 National Election Studies, I examine the contacting patterns of the two major U.S. parties, and argue that political parties contact individuals in the electorate not randomly, but strategically, targeting their canvassing efforts to specific individuals and groups within the elec torate. This can only be done imperfectly, but with technological increases over the last 40 years, the parties have become somewhat more efficient in their contacting activities and in their ability to target such contacts.
The activities of political parties, and particularly local party organi zations, are geared toward cultivating the relationship between the electorate and those who govern, and the traditional theoretical approach to the party emphasizes that role (for discussions and critiques of this literature see Baer and Bositis 1988 and Epstein 1986) . For example, Eldersveld (1982, 4) focused on the importance of political parties as linkage institutions between the mass public and the government. "What [emerge] to facilitate govern ment in modern systems . . . are linkage structures, intermediary organiza tions that help produce positive action and effective decisions in the face of fragmentation, conflict, and mass involvement. These structures are groups that engage in activities and organize initiatives that make cooperative behavior possible. The political party is one major type of a linkage struc ture; some would say it is the central one. " As such, it has been suggested that the party has become an essential element of modem democracy (Schattschneider 1942) .
Political parties, however, are in competition for the scarce rewards the political system allocates, and must compete for the capacity to organize influence (Sorauf and Beck 1988) . Thus, one of the primary roles ascribed to parties is the mobilization of support for political candidates (Schlesinger 1985) . Indeed, Caldeira, Patterson and Markko (1985, 507) argued that mass political behavior can not be understood completely without accounting explicitly for the parties' mobilization role: "Electorates need not merely 'em erge,' the products of faceless social, economic, and psychological forces. Electorates can be brought into vigorous being where there is an active political life." Drawing upon the model of political mobilization developed in Wiel houwer and Regens (1993) , and based upon neoinstitutional economic litera ture, this analysis conceives of political participation as a transaction cost problem. Elections are essentially exchanges (or transactions) between citi zens and the political system. In a world with no transaction costs, indi viduals will participate up to the point where the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of participation. There are a variety o f costs associated with that participation-especially information and opportunity costs (Downs 1957) , and the result is that fewer people vote than would absent these costs. This view of participation has important implications for political parties. Following the formulation of North (1990; see also Coase 1937 ) political parties are institutions that respond to the high transaction costs associated with political behavior by attempting to alter individuals' perception of the costs and benefits that will accrue when they participate, which has the result of changing the levels of participation in a democratic market. Such activities may take the form of advertising, providing resources to candidates (such as poll data, advice on strategy, or media facilities), and canvassing by party workers.
There is no reason to assume that parties undertake the reduction in transaction costs to increase participation in general-they want to win elections. As Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992, 70) noted, " [canvassing] efforts on the part of parties are not unbiased attempts aimed at encouraging diffuse system support; they carry an explicitly partisan message." Therefore, parties should seek to change costs and benefits only as it advantages them. In order to improve their electoral prospects, the parties should be strategic in the use of the canvass as a tool of mobilization, attempting to contact those persons whose participation will increase the parties' candidates' prob ability of winning. The responsibility for implementing such efforts usually falls to state and local party organizations.
The Role of P arty O rganizations
State and local party organizations frequently have the responsibility for getting out the vote. Katz and Eldersveld (1961) found that the strength of the local Democratic leadership was negligible in predicting local voting behavior, while local Republican leadership was a significant factor in mobi lizing voters in the 1956 presidential election. As an explanation for the party differences, the authors concluded (1961, 10) "that, where strong forces have been mobilized over time for one party, additional activity at the precinct level does not help it as much as local activity by the rival party may hurt it." Crotty ( 1971 ) examined the relationship between party activity indices and election results in 100 North Carolina counties for the 1960 presidential and 1962 elections. Party competition scales accounted for little where the variance explained by demographic variables was already high (i.e., in presidential and gubernatorial races). But in lower level races, where demographics and party competition accounted for less variance, party activities made substantial improvements. Recently, Smith (1990) found that county organizational strength was a potent mobilizing force for turnout during the 1988 presidential elections.
The organizational strength of the parties at sub-national levels is also related to the performance of other campaign activities. The Party Trans formation Studies found that one indicator of the strength of local and state party organizations is their programmatic capacities; that is, the extent to which the party organizations cultivate their constituencies through institu tional support activities and candidate-directed activities. Gibson et al. (1983) reported that among the programmatic activities highly related to state organizational strength were the provision of services to candidates and voter mobilization campaigns. Gibson et al. (1985) reported that the activi ties associated with strong local party organizations included coordination with candidate campaign organizations and involvement in several kinds of campaign activities. Over time, state party organizations grew in strength, but this growth was not matched by local party organizations, and regional differences in local strength were different from those observed in the state organizations. Updating the results for the period 1980 -1984 , Gibson, Frendreis and Vertz (1989 reported that local party organizations continued to be strong, and were consistent in performing their programmatic activi ties. Frendreis, Gibson and Vertz (1990) found that local Republican organi zational strength was unrelated to the percentage of the vote received by a GOP candidate in a county. Local strength, however, was strongly related to the probability that the GOP would field a candidate for the state legis lature or U.S. House from the county.
Hermson ( 1986) noted the recent expansion of political action commit tees ' influence in congressional elections, and examined the success of party organizations in the "transitional" period of adjusting to this competition. Candidates of both parties evaluated national party organizations (including congressional campaign committees) as important for providing campaign management assistance, issue development, advertising, and gauging public opinion. Local or state parties, on the other hand, were particularly impor tant for registering voters and conducting get-out-the-vote campaigns.
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H e rrn so n c o n c lu d e d (1 9 8 6 , 6 0 9 ) "even th o u g h local p arty o rg an izatio n s no lo n g e r p lay a d o m in a n t ro le in m an y p h ase s o f ca m p a ig n p o litics, they c o n tin u e to m ak e im p o rta n t c o n trib u tio n s to th o se asp ects o f cam paigning that re q u ire d ire c t co n tac t w ith v o te rs ." P a r t y C o n ta c t T h e in flu en ce o f p a rty activ ities has c o m e u n d e r so m e sc ru tin y . O ne strain o f lite ra tu re fre q u e n tly n o ted th e e x te n t to w h ich local p arty activities p ro v id e v o tin g (an d o th e r in fo rm a tio n a l) cu es to local electo rates (C ro tty K ra m e r (1 9 7 0 ) fo u n d n o n e, w h ile B ochel an d D e n v e r (1 9 7 1 ) an d B lydenb u rg h (1 9 7 1 ) fo u n d th at p arty co n tacts d id in cre ase votes ca st fo r the co n tac tin g p a rty . T h e d iffe re n c e s b etw een th e studies seem to h av e been a fu n c tio n o f the d iffe re n t level o f electio n an aly zed ; K ra m e r e x a m in e d c o n g re ssio n a l an d p re sid e n tial races, w h ile th e latter tw o studies ex a m in ed m u n icip al elec tio n s. T h u s co n tex tu al d iffe re n c e s b etw een e lec to rates and stu d ies a re likely to yield d iffe re n t resu lts (see also H u c k fe ld t an d S p rag u e 1990; K ra ssa 1988; P rice an d L u p fe r 1973). T o w h at ex ten t h av e th e p arties b ee n c o n ta c tin g in d iv id u a ls in th e electo rate? B ased o n th e N atio n al E lectio n S tu d ies, E ld e rsv e ld (1 9 8 2 ) p o in ted o u t th at th e p a rtie s co n tac te d an in c re a sin g p ro p o rtio n o f th e electo rate fro m the 1950s th ro u g h th e m id -1 9 7 0 s. R o se n sto n e an d H an se n (1 9 9 3 ) sh o w ed th at sin ce th e m id -1 9 7 0 s, h o w e v e r, p a rty c o n ta c tin g a p p e ars to h av e lev eled o f f an d th en g o n e into a d ec lin e. D e sp ite this d e c lin e , th e p arties h av e b een co n tac tin g a p p ro x im a te ly 2 0 p e rc e n t o r m o re o f th e electo rate in th e last d ec ad e. M o re o v e r, W ie lh o u w e r a n d L o c k e rb ie (1 9 9 4 ) re p o rted th at th e lev els o f activ ity o f each o f th e tw o m a jo r U .S . p arties p aralle le d each o th e r, th o u g h th e D e m o c ra ts h av e ten d ed to c o n ta c t a m arg in ally h ig h e r p e rc e n ta g e o f th e e le c to ra te th an th e R ep u b lican s.
A s stra te g ists, p a rtie s an d c a m p a ig n e rs a re k ee n ly a w a re o f th e d em o g ra p h ic ch a ra c te ristic s o f th e states an d d istricts in w h ich th ey w ill b e co m p etin g . T h is is a c o m m o n e le m e n t o f th e stra te g y o f w in n in g electio n s:
No subject is more intensely discussed in the privacy of any campaign head quarters, either state or national, than the ethnic origins of the American people and their bloc-voting habits. Men have made careers and politicians have won office by being (or claiming to be) experts on the Polish vote, the Jewish vote, the Irish vote, the Negro vote, the Scandinavian vote, the Italian vote, and what the rights, expectations, offices and dignities of each of these blocs are (White 1961, 222-223) .
In fact, th e K en n e d y c a m p a ig n , u sin g (th en ) sta te -o f-th e -a rt te c h n o lo g y , c o n stru c te d a "sam p le" e le c to ra te b y c o m p u te r sim u la tio n as a tool fo r d e v is ing local an d re g io n a l e lec tio n strateg ies (see P o o l, A b e lso n an d P o p k in 1965). P ric e an d L u p fe r (1 9 7 3 , 4 2 4 -4 2 5 ) d e sc rib e d th e c a n v a ssin g strateg ies o f the 1970 re electio n e ffo rt o f T e n n e sse e S en ato r A1 G o re: "H ig h -D e m o cratic areas w e re d esig n ated as 'p rio rity p re c in c ts ,' a n d th e e x p e rie n c e gleaned fro m a few p ilo t e ffo rts . . . w as d istille d into a c o m p re h e n siv e v o ter-co n tact p lan . . . . T h e stra te g y o f c o n c e n tra tin g o n lik ely h ig h -y ie ld areas d ictated th at can v assin g in th e w h ite c o m m u n ity sh o u ld tak e p lace m ainly in lo w in co m e p re c in c ts ." In a stu d y o f local p a rty c a m p a ig n in g , N o rra n d e r (1 9 8 6 ) fo u n d th at a local p a r ty 's ca n v a ssin g activ ities w e re a fu n ctio n o f local re so u rc e s, access to state p a rty re so u rc e s fo r jo in t p ro g ra m s and o th e r serv ic es, an d th e e x te n t to w h ich a local c h a ir p e rc e iv e d his o r h e r ro le vis-à-vis p a rty m ain ten an ce . re sid e n ts in p re cin cts th at v o ted o v e r 60 p e rc e n t fo r R eag an in 1984, w ith an a v e ra g e ag e o f o v e r fo rty -fiv e , in h o u ses co stin g o v e r $ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 , w ho h av e liv ed th e re fo r m o re th an fiv e y e a rs ." F in a lly , R o se n sto n e an d H an se n (1 9 9 3 , 1 6 2 -1 6 9 ) fo u n d that parties w e re m o re lik ely to c o n ta c t stro n g p a rty id e n tifie rs, u n io n m D a ta A n a ly sis S ince the p arties u n d e rta k e activ ities g e a re d to w ard w in n in g electio n s, an d p ra c titio n e rs c o n ten d that they ap p ro a c h c o n ta c tin g in a p u rp o siv e m a n n e r, it seem s re a so n a b le to test the ta rg e tin g c a p ab ilities o f p arty ca n v a ssin g . D o p arties h av e the ab ility to ta rg e t th e ir co n tac ts su ccessfu lly ?
O r is th e re sim p ly a ra n d o m ch a n ce o f co n tac tin g sy m p ath etic citizen s? Is th e re ev id e n c e th at th e p arties k n o w w h o they sh o u ld co n tac t, an d d o ? O r is th e re a h a p h a z a rd q u ality to c o n tac tin g that su g g ests no p a rtic u la r p attern ? A n u m b e r o f p rio r v ariab les h av e b een id en tified in th e e x ta n t lite ra tu re as related to electo ral s u p p o rt an d co a litio n s. T h e b iv a ria te re su lts o b tain ed by A x elro d (1 9 7 2 , 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986) h av e been a u g m e n te d by the m u ltiv a ria te an aly sis o f E rik so n , L a n c a ste r an d R o m ero (1 9 8 9 ). T h ey fo u n d that the g ro u p ch a ra c te ristic s th at c o n trib u te O th e r re se a rc h has sh o w n th at e v a n g elic al C h ristia n s m ad e im p o rta n t in ro ad s into th e p o litical sp h e re d u rin g th e 1980s. F o r e x a m p le , S m id t (1 9 8 7 ) sh o w ed th at, am o n g e v a n g e lic a ls, su b stan tial ch an g es in p o litical attitud es an d b e h a v io r to o k p la c e b etw e en th e 1980 an d 1984 p re sid e n tia l electio n s. O n e o f th e m o st im p o rta n t sh ifts to o k p la c e a m o n g y o u n g e v a n g e l icals, w h o b ec am e re la tiv e ly p o litic iz e d an d p a rtic u la rly R e p u b lic a n in th e ir p a rtisa n sh ip . In g e n e ra l, e v a n g elic al v o ters sh ifted to th e G O P d u rin g th e 1980s, w h ite ev an g elicals b e c a m e m o re p o litic iz e d , an d th e p o litica l sim ila ri ties b etw e en w h ite ev a n g elic als an d n o n ev a n g elic als w e re a tte n u a te d d u rin g the d ec ad e as w ell (S m id t an d K e llste d t 1992).
T h e in d ic a to r o f p a rty e ffo rts o n b e h a lf o f ca n d id a te s is b a se d o n a q u estio n th at asc ertain s w h e th e r an in d iv id u a l w as co n tac te d . T h e te x t o f th e q u estio n is ,2
The political parties try to talk to as many people as they can to get them to vote for their candidates. Did anyone from one of the political parties call you up or come around and talk to you about the campaign this year? Which party was that?
I m a k e f o u r a s s u m p tio n s a b o u t th e in f o r m a tio n c o n ta in e d in re s p o n s e s to th is q u e s tio n . F irs t, th e q u e s tio n is c le a r a n d e x p lic it in its r e f e re n c e to th e a c tiv itie s o f th e p o litic a l p a rtie s f o r th e sa k e o f c a n d id a te s , so I a s s u m e th a t e ffe c ts o f in te re s t g ro u p a c tiv itie s a re n o t b e in g ta p p e d h e re . It s h o u ld b e n o te d , h o w e v e r, th a t H e r m s o n (1 9 8 6 ) fo u n d th a t u n io n s d o c a n v a s s in g w o rk f o r th e p a rtie s . In s u c h c a se s, th e m e m b e rs o f th e u n io n ( o r a n y o th e r in terest g ro u p fo r th at m atter) a re ac tin g as ag en ts fo r the p arties. T hey are, th e re fo re , p arty w o rk e rs.
S eco n d , I a ssu m e th at re sp o n d e n ts ac c u ra te ly recall the n atu re o f the co n tacts they re p o rt; T e ix e ira (1 9 9 2 , 5 2 , n o te 62) is skeptical o f the validity o f this assu m p tio n , w h ile I do n o t b eliev e th at it is v ery restrictiv e. If the re p o rt o f co n tac t is in acc u rate (w ith in th e n o rm al b o u n d s o f su rv ey re se a rc h ), it m ig h t b e ex p ected that re p o rte d lev els o f co n tactin g sh o u ld track w ith levels o f p arty id en tificatio n an d w ith p u b lic p e rc e p tio n s o f the parties in the U .S . ele c to ra te o v e r th e p e rio d o f the stu d ies. O n n e ith e r co u n t is this the case (see, fo r ex a m p le, F la n ig a n an d Z in g a le 1994, 6 2 -6 3 ; W atten b erg 1990). It m ig h t also b e ex p e cted th at in d iv id u a ls w ith stro n g e r p arty id en ti fica tio n w o u ld re p o rt co n tacts m o re fre q u e n tly th an p e rso n s w ith w ea k er (or no) p arty id en tificatio n . A s I sh o w later, p a rty ID is n o t a p a rtic u la rly good p re d ic to r o f re p o rte d co n tacts.
A th ird a ssu m p tio n is th at th e p e rso n s d o in g th e co n tac tin g accurately re p re se n t th em selv es an d th e ir ca n d id a te . T h is a ssu m p tio n is also n o t very stro n g . I f a p arty w o rk e r co n tacts a p o ten tial v o te r o n b e h a lf o f a. p articu lar ca n d id a te , the p u rp o se o f th at co n tac t is still to in c re a se su p p o rt fo r that ca n d id a te , ev en if the c o n ta c te r m isre p re se n ts his o r h e r o w n id en tity .
F in a lly , w h at re sp o n d e n ts recall as a "p a rty " c o n ta c t m ay in clu d e ca n d i d a te s ' c a m p a ig n o rg a n iz a tio n s. F o r tw o m ain re a so n s, this is n o t v ery p ro b lem atic. F irs t, S ch lesin g er (1 9 8 5 , 1153) su g g e ste d th at "[t]h e b asic u n it o f the p a rty is the n u cleu s, w h ich co n sists o f th e co lle c tiv e e ffo rts to cap tu re a sin g le o ffic e ." P ro c e e d in g fro m this d e fin itio n , a n y o n e w h o is p a rt o f such a co llectiv e e ffo rt (fo r ex a m p le, a c a n d id a te c a m p a ig n o rg a n iz a tio n ), is a p a rty w o rk e r. S eco n d , G ib so n et al. (1 9 8 5 ) o b se rv e d th at it is a co m m o n p ra c tic e fo r local p arty o rg a n iz a tio n s to c o o rd in a te activ ities w ith can d id ate ca m p a ig n o rg a n iz atio n s fo r m o st o ffic es. In su m , w ith a few re la tiv ely w eak a ssu m p tio n s, I b eliev e this q u estio n is a valid in d ic a to r o f in d iv id u a ls ' c o n tacts w ith the p arties an d th e ir w o rk e rs, and is u sefu l fo r testin g th e re la tio n ship s h y p o th esized .
I m ak e u se o f a n u m b e r o f in d ep en d e n t v ariab les (in th re e b ro a d c a te g o rie s) th at are likely to b e related to c itiz e n s ' b ein g co n tac te d by the p a rtie s. S ince m y p u rp o se is to g au g e the targ e tin g o f co n tac ts, the in d e p e n d e n t v ariab les in clu d e o n ly th o se c h a ra c te ristic s that the p arties m ig h t re aso n ab ly b e ab le to assess p rio r to m ak in g the actual co n ta c t. T h u s, v a ri ables su ch as in terest in cam p aig n s an d o th e r p o litical attitu d es an d o p in io n s a re n o t in clu d ed in the eq u a tio n s.
P o litic a l o rie n ta tio n a n d ex p erien ce v ariab les in clu d e a re sp o n d e n t's p arty id en tificatio n , w h e th e r the re sp o n d e n t re p o rte d v o tin g in the p re v io u s p re sid e n tial elec tio n , w h e th e r the re sp o n d e n t w as re g iste re d to v ote in the c u rre n t electio n (o r re p o rte d b ein g re g iste re d as a D e m o c ra t o r R ep u b lican ), and w h e th e r the re sp o n d e n t re p o rte d v o tin g in th e m o st re c e n t p rim a ry (o r a p a rtic u la r p a r ty 's p rim a ry ) in th e ir s ta te .3 P rio r v o tin g e x p e rie n c e is a p p ro p ria te to in clu d e in th ese e q u a tio n s, b e c a u se v o tin g re c o rd s (w ho v o ted , w h o is re g iste re d , in w h ich p a r ty 's p rim a ry a p e rso n v o ted ) a re a m atter o f p u b lic re c o rd , av a ilab le fo r u se b y p a rty o rg a n iz a tio n s, a n d h ig h ly co rre la te d to tu rn o u t. A s m ig h t b e ex p e cted , p a rty id e n tific a tio n an d p a rty re g istra tio n w e re fre q u e n tly re la te d . W h e n in th e c o u rse o f m u ltic o llin e a rity d iag n o stics th ese v ariab les w e re fo u n d to b e c o llin e a r, p a rty ID w as d ro p p e d b ecau se it seem ed m o re lik ely th a t p arties w o u ld h av e a c c u ra te k n o w le d g e o f p arty re g istra tio n th an o f p a rty id en tificatio n .
S tate o r d is tric t c h a ra c te ris tic s in clu d e w h e th e r th e a re a is ru ra l, an d errors in parentheses). People who were registered and registered Democrats were more likely to be contacted in eight of the last nine elections in which this question was asked; Democratic primary voters were more likely to be contacted in four out of seven years. Democratic identifiers and indepen dents were more likely than GOP identifiers to be contacted in five years. Rural areas were canvassed less than urban areas in the 1960s and 1970s. Looking at the regional patterns, there is an anti-southern tendency, with other regions contacted significantly less than the solid south six times, more so 23 times. Since 1968, Democrats seem to have been more active in the Midwest compared with the South. Looking at the demographic characteris tics, higher educational levels are significantly related to contact in 11 of 16 years, and older people were contacted at higher levels beginning in 1986. To what extent have the Democrats been contacting members of their coalition, as defined by Erikson, Lancaster, and Romero (1989) ? Blacks have not been contacted at higher rates than whites; the poor have not been contacted at a rate higher than the nonpoor; union members were contacted at higher levels only twice, and not since 1960; Catholics have been contacted more than Protestants twice, and once less; Jewish people have been contacted more than Protestants three times, and once less. One intriguing result is that in 1960, when Kennedy's religion was an important campaign issue, Catholic and Jewish people were significantly less likely than Protestants to be contacted by the Democrats. This is interesting, in that one could argue logically that the Democrats should have contacted Jews and Catholics at a greater rate than Protestants in order to ensure the turnout of these groups. Instead, they were contacted at lower rates. This suggests that the Democrats knew for whom Catholics and Jews were likely to vote, and did not expend precious resources attempting to mobilize them. In fact, in voter turnout equations (not shown here), Catholic Democrats voted at significantly higher rates than Protestants in 1960, even given the significantly lower contacting rates. In sum, the Democrats have not been contacting members of their electoral coalition very persistently. Table 2 presents the results of equations in which the dependent vari able is contact by a Republican party worker. The GOP demonstrates a general tendency to contact registered citizens and registered Republicans (they were contacted at higher rates in six of the last 12 years), but this tendency is not as consistent as the Democratic pattern. Previous voters were contacted more than nonvoters in 1952, 1960, 1972, 1976 and 1982. Republican identifiers were more likely than Democratic identifiers to be contacted in three years, and there were no differences between indepen dents and Democrats. People living in rural areas have been contacted significantly less than urban residents in ten of the last 13 elections. R eg io n ally th ere is an a n ti-so u th e rn ten d en c y , b u t it is n o t as p ro n o u n c e d as w as seen in th e D em o c ratic e q u a tio n s. N o n -so u th e rn states w e re less likely to b e co n tac te d e ig h t tim es, an d m o re lik ely to b e co n tac te d 2 0 tim e s, b u t this p a tte rn is atten u ated late in th e series: sin ce 1974, sev en re g io n s h av e been co n tac te d less, an d sev en re g io n s h av e b ee n co n tac te d m o re th an states in the so lid S o u th . L o o k in g a t in d iv id u a l c h a ra c te ristic s, p e rso n s w ith h ig h e r ed u catio n al lev els w e re sig n ifican tly m o re lik ely to b e co n ta c te d , an d the h ig h e r o n e 's in co m e, th e h ig h e r th e lik e lih o o d o f b e in g co n ta c te d b y th e G O P sin ce 1960. T h e se fin d in g s a re n o t su rp risin g , g iv en th e attrac tiv e n ess o f R ep u b lican ec o n o m ic p o licies to th e w e a lth y , an d g iv en th e g re a te r p r o p en sity to v o te am o n g p e rso n s w ith h ig h e r e d u c atio n a l lev els an d so c io ec o n o m ic statu s. S ince 1976, o ld e r A m eric an s h av e b e e n co n tac te d a t h ig h e r rates th an th e y o u n g (sev e n o u t o f th e last e ig h t y e a rs), p o ssib ly a fu n c tio n o f the g ro w in g p o litical im p o rta n c e a n d h ig h e r tu rn o u t ra te o f this g ro u p .
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Is th e G O P co n tac tin g m e m b e rs o f its co a litio n ? R ep u b lican s h av e n o t b een c o n tac tin g w h ites sig n ifican tly m o re th an b lack s (e x cep t in 1964 an d 1980); they h av e n o t b ee n co n tac tin g m en m o re th an w o m en ; th ey h av e n o t co n tacted P ro te sta n ts m o re th an Jew s o r C ath o lic s. T h ey h av e c o m e to c o n tact o ld e r citizen s at h ig h e r rates sin ce 1976; h ig h e r in c o m e p e o p le a re m o re likely to h av e b een co n tac te d th an lo w e r in co m e p eo p le; in d iv id u a ls liv in g in ru ra l areas a re less lik ely to h av e b ee n co n ta c te d th an th o se in m e tro p o litan a reas. T h e ev id e n c e is m ix ed : th e G O P d o e s co n tac t o ld e r, ric h e r p eo p le, b u t n o t m em b ers o f th e o th e r g ro u p s in th e ir co a litio n .
O ne p o ssib le re a so n th at th e p a rtie s do n o t a p p e a r to b e co n sisten tly co n tactin g th e ir co n stitu en ts is th at th ese d e m o g ra p h ic fa c to rs w o u ld b e sig n ifican t o n ly if th e p a rtie s co n ta c te d th ese g ro u p s a t rates ex c eed in g th ese g ro u p s ' id en tificatio n w ith th e p a rty . F o r e x a m p le , th e D e m o c ra tic p a rty m ig h t b e d o in g an ad e q u a te jo b at co n tac tin g C ath o lic s, b u t o n ly a t th e ra te at w h ich C ath o lics id en tify (o r re g iste r) as D e m o c ra ts. In o rd e r to test fo r this p o ssib ility , a sec o n d set o f eq u a tio n s w as ru n , d ro p p in g th e p a rty ID an d p a rty re g istra tio n v a ria b le s. A m o n g th o se co n tac te d b y th e D e m o c ra ts, d ro p p in g th ese v aria b le s ca u sed so m e m in o r c h a n g es: v o tin g in th e p re v io u s electio n b ec am e sig n ific a n t fo u r tim e s, a n d tw ice d u rin g th e 1980s w e re b lack s an d C ath o lics each co n tac te d a t h ig h e r ra te s. A m o n g th o se co n tac te d by th e G O P , C ath o lics w e re co n tac te d sig n ific a n tly m o re in 1960 an d sig n ifi cantly less in 1964; b lack s w e re co n tac te d sig n ifican tly less in 1976 an d 1982. In su m , d ro p p in g the p a rty id en tificatio n an d re g istra tio n m easu res in d u ced no c o n siste n t ch an g es o v e r th e series o f e q u a tio n s.
A n o th e r p o ssib le ex p lan a tio n fo r th e re su lts o b tain ed h ere m ig h t b e th at th e p arties w e re ta rg e tin g m o re n a rro w g ro u p s th an th e m easu res u sed in this an a ly sis. T o test fo r this p o ssib ility , a th ird set o f eq u a tio n s w as g en e rated that c o n tro lle d fo r th e targ e tin g o f y o u n g m ales (ag ed 30 and u n d e r), w h ite so u th e rn e rs, an d id eo lo g ically c o n se rv a tiv e C h ristia n s. O nly w h ite so u th e rn e rs w ere co n tacted at rates th at w e re d iffe re n t fro m o th ers, all thin g s b ein g eq u al: in fo u r o f the six p re sid e n tia l elec tio n s sin ce 1968, w hite so u th e rn e rs w ere sig n ifican tly less likely to b e c o n ta c te d . In these cases, the R ep u b lican p arty did not sim p ly m ak e g ain s in th e S outh by d in t o f m ore activ ities (th ere w as o n ly o n e y e a r w h en th e G O P co n tac te d w h ite so u th e rn e rs at a h ig h e r ra te ), b u t m o re d u e to a v irtu al a b d ic a tio n o f the region by the D em o c rats (fiv e o u t o f 11 y ears th e D e m o c ra ts w e re less active am o n g th ese v o ters). In te re stin g ly , C h ristia n c o n se rv a tiv e s w e re on ly c o n tacted at h ig h e r rates by e ith e r p arty in o n e y e a r (1 9 8 2 ), an d then by both p arties.
H a v e th e P a r tie s I m p r o v e d O v e r T im e ?
I su g g ested e a rlie r th at the p arties m ay h av e tak en a d v a n ta g e o f tech n o log ical in n o v atio n s in th e ir ta rg e tin g e ffo rts. If, o v e r tim e, th ere is an in cre ase in the n u m b e r o f in d iv id u al c h a ra c te ristic s th at o b tain sig n ifican ce in the p a rtie s ' c o n tac tin g e q u a tio n s, w e co u ld in fe r th at th e p arties a re doing a b e tte r jo b at targ e tin g th e ir co n tacts b ased on th ese c h a ra c te ristic s. F o r the D em o c rats, th ere is an a v e ra g e o f 4 .3 sig n ific a n t v aria b le s in each equation p rio r to 1974; b eg in n in g in 1974, th e a v e ra g e is 8.1 (re m o v in g th e c o m p e ti tiv e stru c tu re v ariab les th at b eg an in 1978, th e a v e ra g e is 7 .3 ). T h e averages fo r the R ep u b lican s a re 4 .8 and 8 .2 , re sp e ctiv ely (re m o v in g th e co m p etitiv e stru c tu re v ariab les b rin g s th ese av e rag es to 4 .7 and 7 .2 , re sp e c tiv e ly ). On this b asis, the p arties a re so m ew h a t m o re e ffic ie n t at ta rg e tin g th e ir contacts b ased o n th ese v aria b le s, assu m in g they u se th ese c h a ra c te ristic s an d are not ju s t g ettin g lu c k ie r o v e r tim e.
A seco n d in d ic a to r o f ch an g es in the p a rtie s ' ta rg e tin g ca p ab ilities can be o b tain ed by re g re ssin g the p ro p o rtio n o f v a ria n c e e x p la in e d by the m o d els in each y ea r o n tim e. T ab le 3 show s th e b iv a ria te re g re ssio n o f each y e a r's P se u d o -R 2 o n a tim e c o u n te r. B oth c o u n te rs co e fficien ts a re sig n ifi ca n t at the p < .01 level; the D em o c ratic e q u a tio n ex p lain s 66 p e rc e n t o f the v aria n ce, an d the R ep u b lican eq u atio n ex p lain s 60 p e rc e n t. S o lv in g fo r the eq u a tio n s yield s a 12 p e rc e n t in c re a se in the p se u d o -R 2 o v e r th e last 40 y ea rs. W e can thus c o n c lu d e th at the p assag e o f tim e has seen a su b stan tial im p ro v e m e n t in the ab ility o f this m odel to ex p lain the v a ria n c e asso ciated w ith the p a rtie s ' co n tac ts. Note: The dependent variable is the percentage of variance explained by the models in each year (see Tables 1 and 2 ). The "counter" independent variable takes account of the passage of time on the ability of the parties to successfully target their contacts based upon the variables in the model. This variable takes the value of 0 for 1952, 4 for 1956, 8 for 1960, 12 for 1964, 14 for 1966 , and so on.
Discussion and Conclusions
We can compare the results of this analysis with those in Rosenstone and Hansen's (1993) important and useful contribution to the mobilization literature. Many of the characteristics that they found to be highly significant made little contribution to these equations. I can think of two possible reasons why my results were substantially less robust than those obtained by these scholars. First, the differences may hinge upon different coding of some variables. The second, and more important reason for the differences in the two analyses probably lies with the time-oriented nature of the metho dologies. While Rosenstone and Hansen used the NES Cumulative Data File, 1952-1988 , and did not indicate controls for changes in the nature of contacting efforts over time, I assumed that canvassing activities may have changed over time. Therefore, variables that were significant in some years were allowed to be insignificant in others. Moreover, Rosenstone and Hansen did not separately analyze Democratic and Republican contacts.
The results of this analysis show that people who are registered or who are previous voters are significantly more likely to be contacted by both parties than non-voters. Party identification is itself a poor predictor of canvassing, but each party can be successful at targeting their adherents among the population. Overall, these patterns suggest that the parties use lists of previous voters as guides for future contacting efforts. This is an intuitive result, in that one of the best predictors of whether one will vote in the future is whether one has voted in the past.
Other results suggest that canvassing efforts vary according to the organizational strength of the local or state parties and candidate-centered organizations, rather than based on an organized program of contacting d ire c te d fro m the n atio n al p arty h ie ra rc h y . T h is can b e in fe rre d by c o m p a rin g re g io n a l p a tte rn s o f co n tac tin g e ffo rts w ith the ch an g es in th e stren g th o f state p a rty o rg a n iz a tio n s re p o rte d by G ib so n et al. (1 9 8 3 , 1989) . D e m o crats sh o w ed h ig h e r lev els o f co n tac tin g in th e M id w est (c o m p a re d to the S o u th ) b e tw e e n 1966 an d 1972, an d b etw een 1980 an d 1988, m atch in g the re la tiv e s tre n g th o f th e ir o rg a n iz a tio n s b etw e en th e tw o re g io n s in th o se tim e p e rio d s. In te re stin g ly , h o w e v e r, th e p a tte rn do es n o t e m e rg e w ith re g ard to th e e le c to ra lly ric h in d u stria liz e d m id w e ste rn states such as M ich ig an , Illin o is, an d O h io . T h e stre n g th o f D e m o c ra tic o rg a n iz a tio n s in the N o rth e a st an d M id w e st d e c lin e d b etw e en 1970 an d 1980, an d co n tactin g w as not sig n ific a n tly h ig h e r in th o se re g io n s d u rin g th at d ec ad e. In th e W est, D em o c ra tic p a rty o rg a n iz a tio n s g re w in stre n g th a fte r 1980, th at g ro w th being m atch ed b y sig n ific a n tly h ig h e r rates o f c o n ta c tin g th e re a fte r 1974.
F o r th e G O P , ca n v a ssin g to o k p lace to a g re a te r ex ten t in the deep S o u th a fte r 1974, m atch in g th e su b stan tial g ro w th o f th e p a r ty 's o rg a n i za tio n s in th at re g io n . T h e R ep u b lican s h ad stro n g o rg a n iz a tio n s in the M id w e st p rio r to 1970, an d co n tac tin g w as su b stan tially h ig h e r th ere at that tim e. D eclin es in m id w e ste rn p a rty stre n g th a fte r 1975 w e re m atch ed by w e a k e r c o n ta c tin g e ffo rts. T h ro u g h o u t th e tim e c o v e re d by this stu d y , the G O P has had stro n g p a rty o rg a n iz a tio n s in th e W est, an d th e ir co n tactin g p a tte rn s h av e m atch ed th a t stre n g th .
In th e c o n te x t o f th e tra n sa c tio n c o st m o d el an d its h y p o th eses that the p a rtie s w ill selectiv ely seek to ta rg e t th e ir c a m p a ig n activ ities, h o w can these re su lts b e in te rp re te d ? F irs t, th e p arties a p p e a r to h av e tak en ad v a n ta g e o f tech n o lo g ical ch an g es an d a re n o w ab le to co n tac t g ro u p s w ith m o re sp ec i ficity th an ea rly in th e N E S serie s. A s d e sc rib e d in G o d w in (1 9 8 8 ) , the e x te n t to w h ich p arty o rg a n iz a tio n s a re ab le to fin e -tu n e th By the sam e to k en , c o n se rv a tiv e C h ristia n s w e re n o t any m o re likely to be c o n tacted b y th e p arties. It seem s likely that the reaso n fo r this lies in the w elle sta b lish e d co m m u n icatio n n etw o rk s used to reach these citizen s: c h u r c h e s .8 S eco n d , c o m p a rin g E rik so n , L an c aster and R o m e ro 's resu lts w ith th o se p re se n te d h ere, it seem s that the p arties ( 1 ) do not ex p e n d re so u rc e s fo r c o n tactin g g ro u p s th at a re v ery likely to vote fo r th eir c a n d id a te s, an d (2 ) do n o t ex p e n d re so u rc e s fo r co n tactin g g ro u p s that a re v ery u n lik ely to v o te fo r th e ir c a n d id a te s. T h at is, D em o crats do not targ e t b lack s, u n io n fam ilies, C ath o lic s o r Jew s, w ho w ill vote D em o cratic an y w ay . N e ith e r do R e p u b li cans ta rg e t th e ir e ffo rts to w ard th ese g ro u p s, b e c a u se they w ill n o t v o te R ep u b lican .
W h o , th en , a re the p arties targ e tin g ? T h re e an sw ers e m e rg e fro m this an a ly sis. F irst, m arg in al v o ters fro m E rik so n , L a n c a ste r and R o m ero (1 9 8 9 ): in d iv id u als w ith m o re ed u c atio n an d liv in g in u rb a n areas ( T h e tra n sa c tio n c o st m o d el also su g g ests th at the e ffo rts o f the p arties w ill ch a n g e th e p a rtic ip a tio n rates fo r the p e o p le w ith w h o m they co m e into co n tact. W h ile this q u e stio n is n o t ad d re sse d h ere, th e d iscu ssio n in the in tro d u c to ry sectio n s n otes th a t th e p arties a re q u ite effe c tiv e in th e ir m o b ilizatio n e ffo rts. T h e p a rtie s ' co n tacts v ary o v e r tim e, b u t a re im p o rta n t fo r in cre asin g v o te r tu rn o u t an d e n c o u ra g in g in v o lv e m e n t in o th e r p o litical activ ities. T h e re su lts o f th o se an aly ses an d th at p re se n te d h ere su g g e st that the p arties a re in c re a sin g ly e ffic ie n t at ta rg e tin g th e ir m o b iliza tio n e ffo rts to g ro u p s w h o se p a rtic ip a tio n w ill in c re a se the o rg a n iz a tio n s' p ro b a b ility o f w in n in g electio n s.
to th e tw o m a jo r U .S . p o litica l p a rtie s. T h e results o b tain ed in this research im p ly th at th e e ffo rts b ein g m ad e by the p arties are effo rts o f b o th c o n v e r sio n an d lim ited a c tiv a tio n , o n c e re g iste re d and likely v o ters have been c o n ta c te d . T h e p a rtie s a r e stra te g ic in th eir citizen co n tactin g activities, a lth o u g h n o t ex actly as the lite ra tu re w o u ld lead us to b eliev e.
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'Implicit in this discussion of electoral coalitions is the notion that individuals are components of a larger group, and that the behavior of a member of a group is probabalistically related to the behavior of that group (see, for example, Grafstein 1991). In the current context, parties may contact individuals in the hope that they will serve as intermediaries between the party and other individuals who share characteristics. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992, 70) called this effect "cascading consequences," arguing that "[successful efforts at voter mobilization . . . depend upon a process of social diffusion and informal persuasion." 2This text is taken from the 1988 survey; minor changes have occurred in the ques tion wording.
3It was preferable to use each respondent's party identification prior to contact by a party worker. Unfortunately, only presidential election year surveys included a pre election party identification item. Post-election party identification was substituted in the remaining years, but this does not seem to have biased the results in favor of this variable's influence. Party identification is coded as a set of three dummy variables. In the Democratic contact equations Republican identifiers are in the excluded category, while Democratic identifiers are excluded from the Republican contact equations. Many states do not have registration by party. Respondents from those states are coded zero, since the parties can not use that criterion for targeting contacts.
4The equations also included measures indicating the kind of race being run where the respondent lives (open House seat, open Senate seat, incumbent and challenger party labels). The NES has only tracked the types of congressional races in 1966 and since 1978. Results for these variables were inconsistent over time, and so were not reported in the tables. 5Demographic variables included in the equations but not reported were employ ment status and experience (economic adversity), frequency of church attendance, home ownership, ethnicity (hispanic), residential mobility, and marital status. 7It should be noted that even though these models improve in their explanatory ability over time, the proportion o f variance explained by them is rather modest, suggest ing either the omission o f important independent variables or the presence o f a large random component to canvassing activities. Including a variable that controlled for onversus off-year elections did not obtain significance for either party's equations, indicat ing that the parties have not been doing an appreciably better job in either type o f year. 8It should be noted, however, that frequency o f church attendance was generally unrelated to the contacting patterns o f either party. Perhaps the parties proceeded through the authority structure o f local churches, rather than using church membership rolls as targeting mechanisms. If they did use membership lists, frequency o f church attendance might not be expected to have an effect. For example, the Roman Catholic church never purges its rolls, regardless o f the attendance record (or lack thereof) o f its members.
